Georgia Officer Resigns After Alleged Flock License Plate Searches Targeted Ex and Colleague

A former Alpharetta, Georgia, police patrolman resigned after an internal investigation found he allegedly used Flock Safety’s license plate reader system dozens of times to track a former romantic partner and then another officer he believed was connected to her. The case matters because it shows how quickly a tool designed for law enforcement can be turned into a personal surveillance device.

Documents obtained through a public records request indicate that Dustin Bozzo, who left the department this month, repeatedly searched the plates of an ex-colleague between March and May and later expanded the searches to include a second officer and the ex’s uncle. Department records say the conduct triggered a broader internal and criminal investigation, adding to a growing national pattern of misuse involving automated license plate readers.

What happened in Alpharetta?

The Alpharetta Police Department says Bozzo was placed on paid leave on July 20 and resigned on August 5 after investigators reviewed his use of Flock. Lieutenant Jason Hiott confirmed that an active criminal investigation remains underway through the department’s Criminal Investigations Division.

Police Chief Trent Lindgren said the department acted quickly once the alleged misuse came to light and emphasized that the agency expects officers to meet a high standard of conduct. Flock Safety, the company behind the ALPR platform, did not respond to a request for comment.

Bozzo did not answer multiple requests for comment. After WIRED reached out to him on Facebook, he changed both his profile picture and his name on the platform.

Why this case matters

This is not just a workplace discipline story. It is a case study in how an always-on surveillance system can be repurposed for personal curiosity, jealousy, or control when access rules are weak or ignored.

In ordinary life, a breakup might lead someone to check an ex’s social media pages. In a police environment, however, officers may have direct access to a powerful database that can reveal where a vehicle has been seen across a network of cameras. That creates a much more serious risk, because the search can be quiet, persistent, and difficult for the target to detect.

Across the country, there have now been at least 45 documented incidents in which officers allegedly misused Flock to look up or monitor current or former romantic partners, according to the reporting tied to this case. The Alpharetta matter adds detail to a problem that has often been discussed in broad terms but rarely documented in such depth.

How did the alleged surveillance unfold?

According to the internal report written by Alpharetta police Sergeant Jabbar Braithwaite, Bozzo began searching the plate of a former romantic partner 56 times between March and May. The woman was also a fellow Alpharetta officer, though the relationship appears to have violated the city’s workplace-dating ban.

When Bozzo noticed that her car often appeared near another officer’s vehicle, he allegedly started searching that officer too. The report says he ran those searches 29 times over the same period.

Investigators also found that when Flock prompted him to choose a reason for each query, Bozzo frequently selected “Wanted Person” or “Traffic Infraction.” Braithwaite wrote that Bozzo described the choices as a “quick keystroke,” suggesting the entries were used for convenience rather than to reflect the true purpose of the searches.

According to the internal report, investigators concluded that Bozzo understood his actions were improper, even if they could not establish that he acted with malice or a specific intent to harm.

That distinction mattered to the department. Braithwaite did not find proof that Bozzo intended to intimidate or injure anyone, but still determined that the use of Flock fell outside department policy and the system’s approved purpose.

What do the documents say about the relationship?

The paperwork paints a picture of a workplace relationship that drew attention inside the department long before the Flock issue emerged. Bozzo told investigators he had a brief fling with the officer beginning in late 2025. The other officer, who is now a civilian employee with the department, said most of their communication happened on Snapchat.

Both officers acknowledged that they had been sexually intimate, though each said it did not happen while on duty. Still, multiple employees reportedly observed them spending personal time together during working hours and neglecting assigned duties.

That led supervisors to separate the pair, who had been assigned to the same squad and patrol area, and issue them a written directive outlining acceptable workplace interactions. The reports suggest the separation did not end the underlying conduct.

One sergeant later said he saw the two meet in a secluded park at about 2:30 a.m. while Bozzo was working and the other officer was off duty, according to Braithwaite’s account.

How long did the relationship last?

The officers gave different versions. Bozzo said it lasted about a month and ended by mutual agreement. The other officer told investigators it lasted several months and that she ended it herself. Both said the breakup was amicable.

Even with that disagreement, the internal report suggests the relationship created enough friction and concern that supervisors were already monitoring the pair before the plate-reader searches became the focus of the investigation.

Why did Bozzo say he searched the plates?

Bozzo told investigators that he was not trying to threaten anyone. Instead, he said he wanted to make sure the former officer got home safely, especially because she sometimes drove late at night.

He also said he began searching the uncle’s vehicle after learning the woman had been in an accident and was borrowing his car. Between April 5 and April 14, he reportedly searched the uncle’s plate 18 times.

At some point, Bozzo said he noticed another vehicle frequently near the ex-partner’s car and found the pattern strange. That vehicle belonged to a different Alpharetta officer who had recently transferred from another police department.

Bozzo claimed he knew the other officer personally because both had helped the woman move. The second officer confirmed that they had worked together in that setting, and the ex-partner told investigators she had no idea what motivated the searches.

Both the ex-partner and the second officer told investigators they were only friends and had no romantic relationship. The second officer said his interactions with Bozzo had been friendly and respectful.

What is Flock Safety and why are officers abusing it?

Flock Safety makes automatic license plate reader systems that capture vehicle information and allow authorized users to query plate sightings across a camera network. Police departments use the technology to search for stolen vehicles, wanted suspects, and other law-enforcement purposes.

But the same functionality can also reveal someone’s movements or patterns if used improperly. Because the system can store and search sightings over time, a user with access can build a rough map of a person’s travel history without the person knowing.

That is what makes misuse especially alarming. When an officer searches a former partner’s vehicle, the act may be invisible to the target while still exposing location information that can feel deeply personal and invasive.

In this case, the department’s records show how easily the tool could be repurposed. Queries that should have been tied to a legitimate policing rationale were allegedly used to trace a private relationship, a nearby colleague, and a family member’s car.

How widespread is the problem?

The Alpharetta case is part of a broader trend involving police access to ALPR databases. Investigative reporting has documented at least 45 cases nationwide in which officers allegedly used Flock to search for current or former romantic partners.

Those incidents are significant for two reasons. First, they suggest misuse is not an isolated lapse but a recurring pattern. Second, they raise questions about how departments supervise access to a technology that can be used from a desk, a patrol car, or a phone, often with little immediate oversight.

That combination of convenience and power creates a difficult governance problem. A system built to help officers locate vehicles in urgent investigations can also be used for personal reasons that do not leave obvious traces until a review is triggered.

What did investigators conclude?

Investigators did not say Bozzo was trying to stalk anyone in the criminal sense, at least based on the documents reviewed. Braithwaite wrote that there was no evidence to contradict Bozzo’s claim that he lacked malice or an intent to harm.

Still, the department determined that intent alone was not enough to excuse the conduct. Braithwaite ultimately told Bozzo that the searches were inconsistent with police policy and with the approved uses of the Flock system.

That conclusion reflects a broader standard in public safety technology: access is not permission to use data however an officer wants, even if the officer claims a benign motive. Departments have to draw a line between curiosity and official purpose, and the Alpharetta case shows how hard that line can be to police internally.

What happened after the investigation began?

Once the concerns were raised, the department moved Bozzo off duty and eventually accepted his resignation. The internal and criminal inquiries, however, did not end with his departure.

The department says the criminal investigation is still open. That means the consequences could extend beyond internal discipline, depending on what prosecutors and investigators determine about the searches, the records, and any possible violation of state law.

Timeline of the Alpharetta Flock case

• Late 2025: Bozzo says he and the former officer began a romantic relationship.
• March 2026: Flock searches for the ex-partner’s vehicle begin, according to the internal report.
• April 5–14, 2026: Bozzo allegedly searches the uncle’s vehicle 18 times.
• March–May 2026: Searches expand to the second officer after Bozzo notices the vehicles are often near each other.
• July 20, 2026: Bozzo is placed on paid leave.
• August 5, 2026: He resigns from the department.
• Late August 2026: The case becomes public through records obtained by WIRED.

What this case reveals about police tech oversight

The Alpharetta case highlights a structural issue that goes far beyond one officer. ALPR systems are often marketed as policing tools that increase efficiency and public safety, but their utility depends on trust that users will only query them for legitimate reasons.

When that trust fails, departments must rely on audits, logs, and complaint-driven reviews to detect misuse. In practice, that means personal surveillance can continue for weeks or months before anyone notices. The logs may eventually show the pattern, but they do not prevent the abuse from happening in the first place.

This is especially important because Flock and similar systems are becoming common across local law enforcement. As adoption expands, so does the number of officers who can misuse the systems for non-official reasons. The result is a policy challenge for chiefs, city attorneys, and civilian oversight bodies alike.

What safeguards might help?

Departments looking to avoid similar cases often need more than a written rule. They need multiple layers of control, including role-based access, frequent audits, clear disciplinary standards, and technical barriers that flag suspicious patterns such as repeated searches of the same plate.

They also need a culture that treats misuse as a serious breach of public trust, not a minor policy violation. In a small department, a personal relationship can create exactly the sort of temptation that current safeguards are least equipped to catch.

The bigger picture

The Alpharetta story sits at the intersection of two familiar public concerns: police accountability and digital surveillance. It shows that the risk from advanced monitoring tools is not limited to criminals, suspects, or outsiders. Sometimes the greatest threat comes from insiders with routine access and personal motives.

That is why this case is likely to resonate well beyond Georgia. For cities that deploy license plate readers, the question is no longer just whether the technology helps solve crimes. It is also whether departments can prove they are able to stop officers from using that same technology to follow, pressure, or quietly monitor people in their private lives.

For Alpharetta, the immediate issue is a pending criminal investigation and the fallout from a former officer’s alleged misuse. For other departments, the case is a warning that access controls only work if they are backed by real consequences when the rules are broken.

Chief Lindgren said the department takes its responsibilities seriously and moved quickly once the problem was identified, underscoring how damaging even a single misuse episode can be to public confidence.

As more agencies adopt ALPR technology, cases like this one are likely to keep raising the same difficult question: how can police use powerful surveillance tools without letting personal relationships turn official databases into private tracking systems?